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Introduction
The Food and Drug Administration is an agency dedicated to main-
taining the health and safety of the American public. For as long as people have
been purchasing and consuming foods and drugs there have been the problems
of adulteration and imperfect consumer information. In some cases, FDA acts
to protect the consumer against dangers he or she cannot protect him or herself
from by prohibiting access to food containing invisible pathogens or drugs in-
tended for specic maladies beyond lay diagnosis. In other cases, FDA decides
the best approach is to allow for informed consumer choice through labeling
and disclosure requirements. Generally, the latter approach is applied to areas
of aesthetic choice, but even when products are potentially harmful (containing
saturated fats, cholesterol, nicotine, caeine, saccharine, preservatives) FDA is
reluctant to ban them. Ultimate choice is left to the informed consumer, espe-
cially in areas of subjective choice, e.g. whether to consume a lollipop with a
worm inside it or chocolate covered ants.
The policy of informed consumer choice has not been applied to
marijuana. Even though medical opinion and empirical data show marijuana is
far less harmful than legal products like alcohol and cigarettes, marijuana is an
illegal substance in the United States, placed in the most restrictive category
1Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act. Instead of placing jurisdiction in
the hands of FDA to monitor marijuana, we as a country have chosen to give
jurisdiction to the Department of Justice. Instead of allowing FDA to protect
the public against adulteration, we force 12 million American consumers of
marijuana to purchase blindly and illicitly, not knowing what they are getting.
(Forced in the sense that if people choose to use marijuana, they are unprotected
against adulteration. Of course, free will is involved, but the fact is that millions
of Americans who are otherwise law-abiding citizens become patrons of the black
market when marijuana is illegal, as millions of Americans did in the days of
alcohol prohibition.)
It is hard to imagine buying alcohol without knowing its potency
or even whether it has been adulterated with some more dangerous substance
but this is the state of aairs in the area of marijuana. Despite an otherwise
prevailing free market philosophy and the lessons of history with respect to
alcohol prohibition, consumer choice is rejected in favor of marijuana prohibi-
tion. In a time of acknowledged scal crisis where no program is considered
sacred but few taxes are politically viable, we refuse the receipts that could be
reaped from taxed sales of legal marijuana and devote resources to a wasteful
and counterproductive war on drugs.
Demonization, mythology, politics, and irrational laws have con-
spired to produce a misguided marijuana policy in twentieth century America.
Will we continue this unworkable, wasteful, and irrational policy into the next
century? The rst section of this paper will argue for a more rational marijuana
2policy, marked by FDA regulation, informed consumer choice, and decriminal-
ization. We will look at the history of marijuana use to understand the myths
that have shaped past regulation and the realities that should guide reform.. We
will examine the costs and benets of legalization and consider arguments for
and against legalization. The second section will examine the legal obstacles to
rational regulation. Currently the Department of Justice (DoJ) has jurisdiction
of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act. Choices concerning health,
safety, medical opinion, and consumer choice that more properly belong to FDA
fall under DoJ and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) control. For years, the
DEA has blocked rational reconsideration of marijuana regulation.
I. How Could We Rationally Regulate Marijuana in the United
States?
A.History
Marijuana has been used around the world as a spice, medicine, and
stimulant for centuries. While some societies have tolerated use, many govern-
ments before ours have unsuccessfully tried to prohibit use. In our own century,
marijuana use is common in various cultures. As of 1969 the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health estimated that there were between 200 and 250 million
marijuana users worldwide.1 Current medical opinion pronounces marijuana
non-addictive and relatively harmless when consumed occasionally. There has
never been a case of a marijuana overdose. The carcinogens in marijuana smoke
enter the average marijuana smoker's body at a much lower level than the aver-
1Licit and Illicit Drugs: The Consumers Union Report on Narcotics, Stimulants, De-
pressants, Inhalants, Hallucinogens, and Marijuana, Edward M. Brecher, eds. Consumer
Reports, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1972, p.402.
3age cigarette smoker endures{the average marijuana smoker consumes a handful
of cigarettes a week, the average cigarette smoker consumes 20 cigarettes each
day.2
Marijuana has been a part of life in the New World since the sev-
enteenth century. Marijuana was grown as hemp in North America for two
centuries before the Civil War. Even George Washington kept track of his mar-
ijuana crop in diary entries. The U.S. Pharmocopeia listed marijuana from 1850-
1942 and medicinal uses ranged from migraine headaches, gout, and rheumatism
to cholera and mental depression. Fluid extracts of marijuana were marketed
by companies including Parke Davis, Squibb, and Burroughs Weilcome and
sold over the counter by drugstores in the early twentieth century. Marijuana
cigarettes, strangely enough, were sold as an asthma remedy. There is also evi-
dence of occasional recreational use.3 Today there are an estimated 12 million
marijuana users in the United States.4
The movement to outlaw marijuana in this country did not gear up
until after the repeal of alcohol prohibition. The movement built a mythology of
marijuana misinformation, replete with tales of crazed addicts c mmitting mur-
ders while high on the drug. Anti-marijuana crusaders managed to convince
Congress to take action in 1937 with the Marijuana Tax Act. Even though the
American Medical Association pointed out that the case against marijuana was
2Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives, Sci-
ence9/1/89, p.944, vol. 245, Ethan A. Nadelman.
3Licit and illicit Drugs: The Consumers Union Report on Narcotics, Stimulants, Depres-
sants, Inhalants, Hallucinogens, and Marijuana, Edward M. Brecher, eds. Consumer Reports,
Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1972, pp.403-406. [referred to below as Brecher]
4l8 Hofstra L. Rev. 751, 769 (1990)
4built on exaggerated horror stories that demonized marijuana and made ratio-
nal policy design impossible, Congress passed the bill outlawing non-medical
untaxed uses of marijuana.5
It is unclear what motivated the prohibitionists{ perhaps the same
Puritanical impulses that motivated alcohol prohibition. A more cynical ob-
server might point to the liquor industry's interest in wiping out competition
once alcohol prohibition ended. Whatever the impulses, the ensuing wave of
propaganda warped public opinion concerning marijuana. A Gallup Poll in
1969 showed that only 3% of Americans realized marijuana was not addictive
and nearly 30% mistakenly believed marijuana use harmed the nervous system
or led to the use of stronger drugs.6 In a later section we will examine the
Justice Department's role in derailing rational policy, especially after 1970.
B.What Would a Rational Marijuana Policy Look Like?
FDA has a vital role to play in correcting public misinformation
regarding marijuana. FDA's role in protecting the public health and safety is
equally implicated; consumers who purchase marijuana in 1995 do not know
what they are buying and are unprotected against adulteration. Marijuana's
medicinal utility is denied to critically ill patients. Rational marijuana policy
could reap savings of resources currently devoted to a never-ending war on
drugs. Informed consumers could substitute safer marijuana for more harmful
substances like alcohol. It is clear that FDA's traditional role as guardian of
consumer health and safety would be fullled if distribution of marijuana were
5Brecher, pp. 413-418.
6Brecher, p.421.
5subject to FDA regulation. In these times of scal austerity, costbenet analysis
also favors regulated public sale of marijuana{revenues could be collected in tax,
a costly war on marijuana could end.
The purpose of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has been de-
scribed as to protect the consumer from those forms of adulteration and mis-
branding, from which, because of the expanding complexity of modern life, he
is to a large extent unable to protect himself7 Much of the impetus for reform
at the beginning of this century was rooted in the work of muckrakers like Up-
ton Sinclair who discovered all sorts of hidden debris in food. Even though we
tolerate a de minimis level of lth in food today, few consumers would want
to buy a product containing unknown ingredients. It would be preposterous
to sell beer and liquor of undisclosed alcohol content to unsuspecting drinkers.
Of course this is precisely the situation we force on millions of marijuana users
in this country. As Ethan Nadelman aptly points out, nothing resembling an
underground Food and Drug Administration has arisen to impose quality con-
trol on the illegal drug market and provide users with accurate information
on the drugs they consume. So marijuana smokers smoke marijuana that was
grown with dangerous fertilizers, sprayed with the herbicide paraquat, or mixed
with more dangerous substances.8 Instead of following market principles by re-
specting the large demand for marijuana, we needlessly and shortsightedly force
Americans to use marijuana at their peril.
American culture and FDA policy often defer to consumer choice.
74 FDC L.Q. 552, 556 (1949)
8Science, 9/1/89 p.942, Ethan Nadelman. (from now on cited as Nadelman)
6In a modern capitalist economy, we expect government regulators to protect
public health while making the widest array of safe consumer goods available to
us. Informed consumer choice is a valued ideal{from pigs' feet to Hotlix, from
saccharin to color additives, Americans demand free choice. When a product,
like marijuana, is generally regarded as safe and has been used safely for cen-
turies, government prohibition seems like an imposition of one set of aesthetic
values on all consumers. Rational policy in this area would accept the fact that
some people like to smoke marijuana, like some people like to eat the Hotlix
worm. Rational regulators would focus on providing consumers with the best
information to make informed choices about marijuana, from labeling to educa-
tion. Hard facts would replace the myths surrounding this demonized product.
Some commentators have pointed out that society could derive
added benet if alcohol drinkers switched to marijuana. In contrast with mar-
ijuana, alcohol is an extremely dangerous drug. It is abused by 18 million
Americans, at a social cost estimated at over $100 billion a year. There are
thousands of deaths linked directly to alcohol. 20,000 die on the roads each
year in alcohol-related accidents. Cirrhosis of the liver was the eighth leading
cause of death in this country as of May, 1989. About 75 other diseases are
associated with alcohol use and abuse and it is involved in nearly half of all sui-
cides and violent crimes.9 Every fall at colleges around the country, unconscious
students are rushed to hospitals to have their stomachs pumped after overdosing
on alcohol. By contrast there is little evidence that occasional marijuana use
9l8 Hofstra L.Rev. 751, 766-767 (1990) See also Nadelman at p.945
7does much harm at all.10 There is not one case of anyone ever having died from
a marijuana overdose.11 The eect of too much marijuana seems to be sleep.
There is evidence that marijuana smoking tends to replace alcohol consumption,
and in light of the enormous costs associated with alcohol consumption and the
relatively harmless nature of marijuana, one could imagine a rational regulatory
policy including a shift from alcohol to marijuana use as one of its goals.12
One would expect there to be an important reason to justify brush-
ing aside the fundamental policies of informed consumer choice and safety when
we choose not to regulate the marijuana smoked by millions of Americans. It is
hard to nd one, and easy to nd reasons to change our approach. Marijuana
is not just a recreational drug{it has medicinal uses for patients with glaucoma,
multiple sclerosis, and cancer. It has shown promise in increasing the appetite
of AIDS patients suering from the wasting syndrome. Should we keep telling
patients in pain that they cannot have access to this harmless drug that could
markedly improve their quality of life?13
We have seen that FDA has a role to play in protecting public
health, facilitating informed consumer choice, and dispelling myths about the
dangers of marijuana. Cost-benet analysis is another argument for FDA ju-
risdiction over marijuana. Scarce FDA resources would be wisely spent on
establishing regulated marijuana sales in light of the enormous savings we as a
society could realize by pulling out of the war on marijuana.
10Nadelman, pp.943-9~
11Nadelman, p.943.
12Brecher, p.432.
13Nadelman, p.942.
8As politicians emphasize cost-cutting, it makes sense to analyze
current marijuana policy from a standpoint of scal responsibility. It does not
make sense to spend money enforcing prohibition of a relatively harmless sub-
stance when the money could be put to better use feeding the hungry, housing
the homeless, training the unskilled, educating our youth, or healing the sick.
Transferring jurisdiction over marijuana from DEA to FDA would free up wasted
resources. Even after adding the necessary monies to FDA's budget, there would
be quite a bit of overall savings, as we shall see.
The history of marijuana prohibition reveals a misguided, ineec-
tive regulatory policy that seems to do more harm than good. In 1988 police
arrested 600,000 people each year solely for possession of an illicit drug, which
was usually marijuana. Instead of collecting tax revenues from sales of legal
marijuana, the government spends over $10 billion annually on enforcement of
drug laws. The success of interdiction eorts aimed at reducing the amount of
marijuana imported into the United States has been limited. Domestic produc-
ers have lled the gap and the U.S. has become one of the world's top producers
of marijuana. Even when marijuana is successfully kept away from the pub-
lic, users simply switch to more dangerous and more potent drugs like alcohol,
cocaine, and heroin when they have no access to marijuana.14
Political candidates emphasize the threat crime poses to society,
but there is seldom any analysis of why crime is such a problem. One of
the causes is drug prohibition. As mentioned above, thousands of arrests each
14Nadelman, pp.939-941. See also Brecher at p.435 for description of marijuana users switch-
ing to harder drugs when marijuana is not available.
9year involve non-violent oenses. We often hear about the lack of prison space
and how violent oenders go through a revolving door when they enter prison,
quickly returning to the streets. But we choose to arrest thousands of non-
violent oenders and to ll our prisons with drug criminals.15Law enforcement
does not focus on violent crimes, murders, armed robberies, domestic abuse,
rape, or big money white collar crime{unless they tie in to drug enforcement.
In fact, [un many cities, urban law enforcement has become virtually synony-
mous with drug enforcement.16
Some might argue that drug violators are inherently violent or evil
and that law enforcement is properly focused on drug enforcement. It is simply
not true that marijuana users are provoked to violence when they use marijuana.
Any suspicion about a link between marijuana inmates were imprisoned for
drug crimes. use and violence probably is connected to the mythology and
demonization of marijuana that dates back to the 1930's and was discussed
in an earlier section of this paper. It is not clear that cocaine or heroin are
more violence-provoking than alcohol, but those drugs are not the subject of
this paper. For the purposes of an argument to rationalize the regulation of
marijuana, it is enough to point out that any violence associated with marijuana
stems from our irrational policy choice and not from marijuana consumption per
se. By criminalizing marijuana use, we create the conditions for a black market.
Any thoughtful criminal would be remiss to overlook the vast sales potential
of illegal drugs. Currently, more than half of all organized crime revenues are
15Nadelman, p.940{as of 1989, 1/3 of 50,000 federal inmates and 1/10 of 550,000 state
16Nadelman, p.941.
10believed to derive from the illicit drug business.17 By legalizing the sale of
marijuana, we could begin to put a real dent in organized crime. Politicians
who claim to be tough on crime but support drug prohibition ought to be asked
why they support a policy that gives comfort and sustenance to organized crime.
The costs of drug prohibition are wasted law enforcement resources,
unregulated sales of adulterated marijuana, lost tax revenues that could derive
from legal sales of marijuana, violence associated with organized criminal drug
tracking and sales, and diversion of public attention away from real problems
onto a phony war against marijuana and other drugs. The benets are more
dicult to see. Some argue that drug prohibition reduces the use of marijuana.
This may be true, but there are still~millions of users we force to surreptitiously
purchase marijuana. And increased marijuana use might not be a negative
thing if the public does indeed substitute marijuana for more dangerous drugs
like alcohol. This would bring a quantiable savings in health costs and an
unquantiable savings in human lives not lost to drunk drivers, cirrhosis of
the liver, domestic abuse or any of the other dangers associated with alcohol
abuse.18 One could argue that marijuana should not be accessible to children
but of course marijuana need not be legally saleable to minors. Some argue that
not enough is known about the long term eects of marijuana on the brain. This
is a more troubling argument. However, currently legal drugs like nicotine and
alcohol have long term destructive health eects that we know about and this
does not halt their sales. If FDA decides that it is in fact a concern, it could
17Nadelman, p.941.
18Nadelman p.943{all of the health costs of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin combined
amount to only a fraction of those caused by [cigarettes and alcohol].
11require labeling indicating that use of marijuana may produce long term harm
to the brain, similar to the Surgeon General's warning on packs of cigarettes.
The very fact that marijuana is illegal makes it dicult to gather information
about its eects{scientic studies are curbed, users are reluctant to participate
in surveys or investigations. And the long list of arguments for legalization cited
previously outweigh this one uncertainty.
II.Legal Obstacles to Rational Regulation of Marijuana
A.The Current Regulatory Framework
There are formidable legal obstacles standing in the way of legal-
ization and rational FDA regulation of marijuana. Marijuana is specically ex-
cluded from the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and placed under Department of
Justice jurisdiction by the Controlled Substances Act of l970.19 Petitions to the
Attorney General and appeals to the judicial system over the past two decades
have failed to achieve re-classication of marijuana under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act.20 Marijuana is currently classied as a Schedule I substance, the
category reserved for the most dangerous and addictive substances that possess
no medicinal value.21 The current regulatory scheme is wildly inappropriate,
based on transparent myths about marijuana instead of thoughtful evaluation
of scientic knowledge.
Rational reform depends on a courageous regulator or legislator
who can point out that it is time to re-think an irrational regulatory scheme.
19Marijuana is specically exempted by 21 U.S.C. sec.321(v)(3). The Controlled Substances
Act begins at 21 U.S.C. section 801.
20NORML v. DEA 559 F.2d 735, 748 (D.C. Circuit, 1977),NORA'IL v. DEA 930 F.2d
936,
2121 U.S.C. 812(b)(l)
12There are several possible ways in which reform could proceed. The Controlled
Substances Act provides some procedural avenues for challenging the classi-
cation of substances. Under 21 U.S.C. sections 81 1(aX2), (b) the Attorney
General in consultation with the Department of Health and Human Services
has the authority to decontrol or reschedule controlled substances. As noted,
petitions to the Department of Justice as represented by the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) have not produced rescheduling of marijuana.22 The Attorney
General also has the authority to register a manufacturer to produce Schedule
[substances if it is in the public interest to do so23 This is an intriguing pos-
sibility, but again the past intransigence of the Justice Department and DEA
discourages much optimism in seeing this provision invoked.
Another possibility is Congressional action. Congress could rework
the statutory treatment of marijuana, placing it within the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and allowing FDA to939 (D.C. Cir. 1991). regulate. However,
given the eect of years of anti-drug propaganda on the American public it
would probably be political suicide for a politician to advocate such measures
in 1995. It would take a brave, seless, farsighted leader to challenge anti-drug
stereotypes in a dogged, relentless campaign against irrationality. And even a
campaign of this type would probably fail to convince a dogmatic Congress and
a misinformed public.
FDA could play an important role in straightening out a misin-
formed public. Obviously, this would be a politically dangerous policy choice
22NORML v. DEA 559 F.2d 735, 748 (D.C. Circuit, 1977)
2321 U.S.C. sec.823(a)
13and it would probably be illegal for FDA to produce literature debunking mar-
ijuana myths at this point. Given limited resources, it is not surprising that
FDA chooses to avoid the topic of marijuana reform.
B.Past Challenges to an Irrational Regulatory Scheme
Legal challenges to the Controlled Substances Act have focused on
the rationality of the statute. Given the utter irrationality of marijuana regu-
lation, this seems an appropriate challenge. However, courts have consistently
refused to overrule Congress and have sometimes used cases involving marijuana
as an opportunity to embrace unsubstantiated myths about marijuana.
In U.S. v. Kuch 288 F.Supp. 439 ( D.C., 1968), a case decided
before the Controlled Substances Act was enacted, a defendant claimed that the
Marijuana Tax Act interfered with her religious beliefs and practices. In holding
that the First Amendment does not give unbridled freedom to smoke marijuana
or use LSD, the court seemed to be guided more by rejection of the Sixties
counterculture than by rational inquiry in evaluating the dangers of marijuana
use. The court wrote that [t]here is abroad among some in the land today a
view that the individual is free to do anything he wishes. A nihilistic, agnostic
and antiestablishment attitude exists. 24This statement reveals some of the
emotional and political bases for opposition to legalized marijuana. Marijuana
was an emblem of the 1960's in many ways and legalization no doubt represented
a form of anarchy to those who looked askance at the counterculture. It is
interesting to consider these words in light of our almost unbridled faith in the
24288 F.Supp. 439, 445
14free market today. In a sense, there is a view today that producers are free to
produce whatever they wish. This is linked to capitalism and the free market
philosophy. Government regulation is deemphasized, even scorned. Ironically,
the words once used to condemn marijuana as an emblem of unbridled freedom
could now be part of a free market argument for legalizing marijuana in the
interests of consumer choice.
Following passage of the Controlled Substances Act in 1970, a se-
ries of challenges to the statute have been reviewed and rejected by the courts.25
Courts have been understandably reluctant to reject Congress's actions. The
real problem, however, is not that Congress is asserting authority instead of the
courts. The real problem is that health and drug experts are not included in
the discussion. Marijuana is outlawed because it is said to be addictive and haz-
ardous to health.26 FDA's mission is to protect the public health and provide
information that lets consumers make informed choices. It would make more
sense to give FDA the authority and resources to regulate marijuana than to
continue vesting authority in bodies like Congress and DEA that have shown
no ability to rationally evaluate and handle the problem of marijuana. The Na-
tional Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) has attempted
to convince DEA and the courts that marijuana policy should be rationalized.
Over the past twenty years, DEA has successfully played a delaying game, stub-
bornly refusing to reconsider marijuana policy in the face of court decisions
25U.S. v. LaFroscia 354 F.Supp. 1338 (U S D C, S.D N.Y, 1973) holding that there is a
rational basis for placing marijuana on Schedule I See also U.S. v. Kier 477 F.2d 349 (2d
Circuit, 1973) and U.S. v. Bergdoll 412 F.Supp. 1308 (Delaware, 1976)
2621 U.S.C.sec.812(b)(1) see also U.S. v. Kuch 288 F.Supp. 439, 446
15urging reconsideration. The D.C. Circuit found that Congress had intended
that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare play a role in evaluat-
ing the scheduling of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act and that
DEA had attempted to shut out HEW input in the past. The D.C. Circuit's
analysis of marijuana was reasonable and thoughtful{medical evidence concern-
ing the safety of marijuana was considered instead of anecdotal myths about
marijuana's inherent evil.27 However, remand did not produce a rescheduling
of marijuana.
In 1991 NORML reached the D.C. Circuit again after DEA had
rejected an administrative law judge's recommendations that marijuana be re-
classied. This time, the court was susceptible to DEA's circular argument that
marijuana could not be medically useful because only a minority of U.S. doctors
recommended marijuana for medical use. This argument is awed because it
seems unlikely that most doctors would reject our cultural biases against mari-
juana. It might make sense to consider the opinions of doctors who actually had
studied marijuana but to consider the opinions of doctors in general does not
seem likely to produce an informed judgment as to marijuana's safety or medical
usefulness. Also, the court was only asked to consider whether marijuana was
eective as a medicine. The irrational policy of restricted recreational use was
not examined. 28
The court did point out that part of DEA's 8 factor test for reschedul-
ing could not be relevant to marijuana. Three of the factors ask whether the
27NORAsfL v. DEA 559 F.2d 735, 748 (D.C. Circuit, 1977)
28NORML v. DEA 930 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
16drug is generally available, used by a substantial of medical practitioners, and
recognized in generally accepted pharmocopeia. As a Schedule I drug, there is
no way marijuana could be generally available or used by a substantial num-
ber of doctors{drugs placed in Schedule I are not widely available. 29 Other
courts have been sympathetic to the arguments for reform. The Second Circuit
in U.S. v. Kier admitted that it is apparently generally accepted that most
users [of marijuana] do not suer any signicant ongoing harm. The Second
Circuit only deferred to Congress because the present state of knowledge of the
eects of marihuana is still incomplete and marked by much disagreement and
controversy. 30 It is a problem that not enough is known about the long term
eects of marijuana use. One could argue that long term studies are called for
before legalization occurs. However, currently legal drugs like nicotine and al-
cohol have long term destructive health eects. It is not enough to say that we
do not understand everything about marijuana and therefore it cannot be legal.
As mentioned earlier, the very fact that marijuana is illegal makes it dicult
to gather information about its eects{scientic studies are curbed, users are
reluctant to participate in surveys or investigations.
C.Proposed FDA Regulation of Marijuana
The question of how FDA should regulate marijuana could be an-
swered in several ways. Marijuana could be a prescription drug subject to a
New Drug Application (NDA) and available only as a medicine. Marijuana
could be readily available over the counter for recreational and medicinal pur-
29NORML v. DEA 930 F.2d, 940
30U5. v. K~er 477 F.2d 349, 353 (2nd Circuit, 1973)
17poses Marijuana could be subject to a dual system of regulation: marijuana
sold for recreational purposes would be regulated by standards of purity and
marijuana making a theraputic claim could be subject to a NDA and sold on a
prescription basis.
FDA should promulgate a dual system depending on whether the
product is sold for recreational purposes or for medicinal purposes. FDA should
assert jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C.sec. 201(g)(l). The D.C. Circuit in ASH
v. Harris held that manufacturer intent is dispositive in the area of cigarette
regulation (or lack thereof).31 The D.C. Circuit did not nd the requisite man-
ufacturer intent to bring cigarettes under sec. 201(gXl)(C) of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act. However, a direct application of the ASH holding is not
desirable{one of the arguments for changing regulatory policy with respect to
marijuana is so that FDA can protect consumers from adulterated product. The
failure to bring cigarettes under FDA jurisdiction has proved to be a mistake.
Cigarette manufacturers were found to have surreptitiously added nicotine to
their cigarettes in order to enhance the addictive eects of their product. Con-
sumers were deceived as to the product they were buying and consuming.
Marijuana could be distinguished from cigarettes and placed un-
der FDA control. There is no reason to believe that marijuana manufacturers
could be trusted not to adulterate their product. Unsupervised manufacturers
would have incentive to adulterate their product to make it cheaper. Although
competitors theoretically act as a monitor against adulterators, the threat of
31A5H v. Harris 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980), holding that nicotine cigarettes are not
subject to FDA regulation because manufacturer intent to aect the structure or any function
of the body of man was not established.
18adulteration of marijuana is too important to be left to market forces. It would
be a shame if marijuana were nally legalized but consumers still found them-
selves at the mercy of manufacturers, with no protection against adulteration.
FDA's role in public safety points the way to a system that polices against
manufacturer adulteration.
While recreational marijuana could be brought under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act under 21 U.S.C.201(g)(1)(C), marijuana intended for
use by AIDS patients or people suering from glaucoma would clearly be making
a health claim and falls under 21U.S.C.2O1(g~1)(B). Marijuana intended as
medicine is more problematic. Should the lengthy NDA process be required?
Should it be sold over the counter? It seems desirable to have patients with
glaucoma or AIDS taking medicine under medical supervision. However, one
could argue that patients with these conditions need help right away and should
not have to wait out a long approval process. One could argue that marijuana
falls under the GRAS exception by virtue of its track record of safety. This
is a dicult choice, but because this product is making a claim of ecacy
(unlike recreational marijuana) in disease treatment and because all new drugs
today start as prescription drugs, there should not be an exception made for
marijuana. The NDA process could resolve once and for all any uncertainties
about safety and ecacy and publicity could help change public bias against
marijuana. Patients who need immediate access could use synthetic THC which
has been approved for limited medical use by FDA and DEA.32
3251 FedReg. 17476 (May 13, 1986)
19III.Conclusion
It is at times frustrating to consider the circumstances of marijuana
regulation in the United States today. After reading about the long and safe
history of marijuana use and the anti-marijuana propaganda developed in this
century, it is dicult to see the prohibition of marijuana as anything but irra-
tional. While it is dicult to see immediate reformation, we can keep our eyes
on certain goals. We should not continue to feed new generations of Americans
misinformation about marijuana while we condone the use of more dangerous
drugs like cigarettes and alcohol. We should not continue to wage a costly and
interminable war against drugs while deeper social problems go unaddressed.
We should not create a breeding ground for organized crime that allows the
criminal underworld to grow rich o the demand for marijuana that is not met
by the licit free market. We cannot let patients suering from glaucoma and
AIDS to be denied relief for decades to come. We must learn the lessons of the
history of alcohol prohibition. We must not enter a new century weighed down
by myths of the past.
20